Security
What this product does with your machine and your data, stated so you can decide rather than assume.
What leaves your machine
Your prompts, and whatever files the agent reads on your behalf, go to the endpoint you configured and nowhere else. There is no gateway of ours in the middle.
If that endpoint runs on your own machine, nothing leaves it.
Two exceptions, both of which fail quietly offline and neither of which carries anything you typed:
- the desktop app asks its update endpoint whether there is a newer version
- the Models panel fetches a list of popular models from Hugging Face when opened
What the agent can do to your machine
Two settings, doing different jobs.
The sandbox decides what it can do. Under workspace-write — the
default — it may write anywhere inside its working directory and nowhere
else. Reads are never restricted, in any mode.
Approvals decide what it must ask about first, from every unfamiliar command down to nothing at all.
The combination worth being careful with is danger-full-access together with
never: an agent running arbitrary commands with nothing shown and nothing
asked. There are directories where that is right. Your home directory is not
one of them.
Sandbox and approvals has the detail.
Where a background run may start
A run whose directory is not the workspace, a department, or somewhere you
allowed by name is held rather than started. This exists because a
scheduled task made before departments existed carried a home directory and
had run forty-two times, each run able to reach .ssh and Documents, with
nobody asked.
Setting approvals to never turns this off along with everything else, which
is what that setting means.
Keys
API keys are kept out of config.toml, because that file gets shared and
pasted into issues. They are written where your other secrets are, and never
shown again once saved.
Connector keys work the same way: you name the environment variables a server needs, and the values are stored separately from the server's configuration.
The gateway
The desktop app and the web UI talk to a local gateway. It:
- binds loopback unless explicitly told otherwise, so it is not exposed to the network by accident
- requires a token on every connection, generated per run and printed once, so another local user — or a web page in your browser — cannot drive it
A client of this gateway can make the agent run commands on the machine hosting it. That is the whole point, and it is why the token exists.
It is single-user by design. Serving several untrusted people would need per-user sandboxing, which is out of scope.
Paired phones
Pairing hands a device a token that lets it drive the agent on this machine. The address is shown once. Pair only your own devices, and revoke anything you do not recognise.
The builds are not signed
No Apple or Microsoft certificate, so your operating system cannot tell who built them and says so. That warning is correct and you should read it as correct.
If you would rather not take our word for any of it, the source is
here and it is one cargo build.
Reporting something
Security problems: open an issue marked as such, or email the address in SECURITY.md.
Please do not include your keys or logs that contain them.